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JURISDICTION OP THE COURT 
This appeal is from the decision of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Judge Lynn Davis, denying Appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss and denial of Appellant's Motion to Dismiss following an 
entrapment hearing and from final judgment of conviction and 
sentence following conditional no-contest pleas to one (l) count of 
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree 
Felony, and one (1) count of Possession of a Listed Chemical with 
Intent to Manufacture a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree 
Felony, said judgment having been entered April 27, 1993. Section 
78-2a-3 (2)(f), Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, confers 
jurisdiction upon this Court to hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT OP THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the lower court commit reversible error by failing to 
dismiss the State prosecution of the Appellant for the same conduct 
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which involved a federal prosecution terminated by a violation of 
Appellant's right to a speedy trial? 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in denial of 
Appellant's right to due process and speedy trial as guaranteed by 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States? 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by not 
granting Appellant's motion to dismiss for failure of the State to 
produce a material witness? 
4. Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying the 
Appellant's claim of entrapment? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS, 
JR. , for one (1) count of Arranging to Distribute a Controlled 
Substance, a Second Degree Felony, and one (1) count of Possession 
of a Listed Chemical with Intent to Manufacture a Controlled 
Substance, a Second Degree Felony, Following the denial of 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss for Entrapment after an evidentiary 
hearing, and the denial of Appellant's Motion to Dismiss upon 
denial of speedy trial rights, double jeopardy grounds, collateral 
estoppel and due process, Appellant, pursuant to plea agreement and 
State v, Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), entered a plea of no 
contest to each of the counts stated above. Appellant was 
sentenced to serve two (2) concurrent sentences of 1-15 years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 26, 1992, Appellant was arrested by law enforcement 
officers and charged with three (3) separate counts of drug 
violations in Utah County, all having alleged to occur on August 7, 
1991. (See Exhibit "A") Appellant was charged to have violated 
§58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) , Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, 
Methamphetamine, a Second Degree Felony, and two (2) counts of 
violating §58-37c-4, Possession of a Listed Chemical with Intent to 
Manufacture a Controlled Substance, both Second Degree Felonies. 
While incarcerated in Oregon waiting trial on charges which 
were subsequently dismissed, Appellant became acquainted with a 
prisoner named Ross Argyle. Mr. Argyle was being held for 
extradition to the State of Utah for a probation violation. Argyle 
and Appellant exchanged addresses and telephone numbers, as 
Appellant was interested in working in the construction business 
upon his release and Argyle claimed to have contacts who could use 
additional help. Argyle was released and soon thereafter, the 
charges against Appellant were dismissed and he was released. 
(Addendum, Exhibit "B") Upon his release, Appellant received a 
telephone call from Argyle made to Appellant's parents7 home in 
Reno, Nevada. Argyle requested that Appellant come to Utah and 
help manufacture methamphetamine. Argyle called again later and 
this time asked the Appellant to come to Utah and teach Argyle and 
a person named "Kenny" how to manufacture methamphetamine. (Tape 
trans. 8-31-91) When Appellant was reluctant, Argyle said they 
would pay him $10,000.00 for his assistance and provide him with 
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transportation from Reno, Nevada, to Wendover, Utah, where he would 
be picked up and brought to another location in Utah. Appellant 
had no money and therefore agreed to come to Utah. (Hr. pp. 3 6) 
Argyle was working with the Provo Police Department and made 
the telephone calls to Appellant in return for money and to avoid 
jail time for a probation violation. The Provo police officers 
involved other Utah County officers and a DEA agent in the plan. 
The DEA agent, Illsley, picked Appellant up, purchased beer for him 
and transported him to Utah County where the officers had a motor 
home set up as a clandestine lab. The materials, facility, and 
equipment was all provided by the officers. Upon arrival at the 
site, Appellant was shown $10,000.00 in cash to induce him to 
follow through. Appellant was arrested before any controlled 
substance was manufactured. (Hr. pp. 83-84) 
On August 15, 1991, Appellant was indicted by a grand jury in 
the United States District Court, Central Division, District of 
Utah, case number 91-CR-193G, in an Indictment alleging violations 
of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(l) and §846 which prohibit the intentional 
manufacture, distribution, dispensing or possession with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance, and 
the attempt or conspiracy to do commit the offense. Appellant was 
incarcerated in pretrial confinement awaiting trial in federal 
court. After several delays, Appellant moved to dismiss the 
federal Indictment upon the grounds of a denial of speedy trial. 
United States District Judge Thomas Greene granted Appellant's 
motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial on August 25, 1992, and 
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dismissed the Indictment with prejudice. On August 26, 1992, the 
Appellant was released from the jail in which he had been held 
pending trial, but was immediately arrested on a warrant for the 
charges in the present case. Bail was set in the amount of 
$10,000.00, but the Appellant was unable to afford a bail bond. 
After being unsuccessful in obtaining a pretrial release in the 
state system pending trial due to his impecuniosity, the Appellant 
filed a motion to reduce bail. Said motion was denied by the trial 
court and Appellant remained incarcerated throughout the whole time 
of his arrest on federal charges and through all of the state 
proceedings. 
Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of speedy trial, 
the denial of due process; in that, jeopardy had attached in the 
federal prosecution and that the State was prohibited from 
prosecution by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, raised the 
issue of the prohibition against prosecution under §§76-1-404 and 
76-1-403 and raised the defense of entrapment. Prior to the 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of entrapment, the Appellant filed 
a Motion to Secure Attendance of Out-of-state Witness, stating the 
Appellant's claim that the informant Argyle was material to his 
defense of entrapment. At the evidentiary hearing on December 10, 
1992, the State did not call or produce the informant Argyle. 
After discussion of the Appellant's request and motion, the Court 
ordered the State to produce the witness Argyle. The remainder of 
the hearing was continued until March 8, 1993, to allow the State 
sufficient time to locate Argyle. (Hr, pp. 8, 98-99) The State 
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indicated they could not locate Argyle at the time of the hearing 
on March 8, 1993. Appellant's counsel moved the Court for an order 
dismissing the matter as a result of the failure of the State to 
produce a witness material to Appellant's defense. No further 
witnesses were called. The court, after receiving several written 
memorandums and holding the partial evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of entrapment, ruled against the Appellant on all issues 
which had been raised by motion. (Addendum, Exhibit "C") 
Appellant then entered into a plea agreement with the State in 
which Appellant agreed to enter pleas of no contest to two (2) of 
the counts of the Information pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 
935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) to preserve his right to appeal the 
rulings on his Motions to Dismiss and the Court's denial of the 
entrapment defense. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The lower court committed reversible error in denying 
Appellant's Motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial under the 
federal and state constitutional guarantees of speedy trial, since 
the State was fully aware that the Appellant was held on the acts 
constituting the state charges. The law enforcement team in charge 
of the investigation consisted of agents from DEA as well as local 
Utah County officers. 
The trial court committed reversible error by its denial of 
Appellant's claims of double jeopardy, collateral estoppel and 
denial of due process in violation of the constitutional guarantees 
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of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. Where the prosecution team with the exception 
of the attorney prosecuting the case is the same as that involved 
in the federal prosecution, and the evidence, criminal episode, and 
witnesses are the same in both prosecutions, Appellant's right 
against double jeopardy should protect him from the subsequent 
state prosecution. In the alternative, the principles of 
collateral estoppel should prohibit the State from proceeding after 
the federal prosecution has been terminated upon a denial of speedy 
trial. 
The trial court committed reversible error by denying the 
Appellant's claim of entrapment. The trial court should have found 
that the Appellant was entrapped as a matter of law where the 
Appellant had no means, intent or prior involvement in the State of 
Utah and where the criminal plan was created solely by the officers 
without any prior participation on the part of the Appellant. 
The Appellant's rights to due process of law and compulsory 
process under the provisions of the Utah State Constitution and the 
Constitution of the United States was violated by the failure of 
the State to produce an informant who played a vital role and who 
was material to the defense of the Appellant. The court did not 
make any finding that the State had made reasonable efforts to 





THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE 
STATE PROSECUTION OF THE APPELLANT IN VIOLATION OF THE COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Standard of Review. 
The standard of review in regard to this issue is that of a 
review for correctness. 
B. The trial court committed reversible error by failing to 
dismiss the state prosecution of the Appellant where the federal 
court had determined that he had been denied right to speedy trial 
on charges involving the same conduct. 
Appellant asserts that the procedural due process guaranteed 
him by the federal constitution has been violated by the 
institution of this prosecution following the dismissal of the 
federal case upon speedy trial grounds. The collateral estoppel 
doctrine of the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution applies 
in this case. In U.S. v. Belcher, 762 F.Supp 666 (W.D. Va. 1991), 
the court considered a case where the defendant had been convicted 
in a state prosecution and then obtained a reversal on appeal, at 
which time he was federally prosecuted for the same acts. 
Recognizing the general principle of "dual sovereignty" to allow 
independent federal and state prosecutions of defendants for the 
same acts, the court also stated limitations on that general 
doctrine. The limitation set forth in the Belcher case is that 
where the same individuals are involved in the prosecution (in that 
case, the state prosecutor also functioned as a special assistant 
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federal prosecutor), the court found a lack of independent exercise 
of power and held that the subsequent federal prosecution by the 
same prosecutor of the same subject matter was merely a "sham and 
a cover" for the failed state prosecution and that the doctrines of 
collateral estoppel prohibited the subsequent prosecution. 762 
F.Supp 666, at 671 
It is Appellant's position that the federal and state entities 
are so closely entwined in this case that the dual sovereignty 
doctrine does not apply. The fact that the state prosecutor 
himself was not directly involved in the prosecution in the federal 
case is not a distinction which would defeat the collateral 
estoppel claim in this case since the local and state law 
enforcement agencies were directly involved in the federal 
prosecution. See State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, which held that 
the law enforcement officers and the prosecutor are a team and 
information known to one is attributable to the other. See also 
Barbee v. Warden. 331 F2d 842, on this point. 
Appellant submits that the Appellee, State of Utah, should not 
be able to avoid the speedy trial claims of the Appellant by the 
claim that their arrest of the Appellant was the triggering act for 
speedy trial purposes. Since the local officers were involved 
directly in the federal arrest and prosecution, the time for speedy 
trial purposes should run from that federal arrest and the decision 
of Judge Greene dismissing the prosecution of the Appellant with 
prejudice upon speedy trial grounds and should estop the State from 
further prosecution. Otherwise, any defendant charged federally 
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could be held as was the Appellant for a period of time, which 
violates his constitutional right to a speedy trial, only to be 
subject to state prosecution for the same offenses. The later 
prosecution then becomes a tool or "sham" prosecution of the 
federal government to allow the defendant to be prosecuted despite 
constitutional violations. Such is the evil that the case law 
cited above seeks to avoid. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE SPEEDY TRIAL CLAUSE OF THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WERE 
VIOLATED BY THE DELAY IN FILING STATE CHARGES. 
A. The Standard of Review. 
The standard of review in regard to this issue is that of a 
review for correctness. 
B. The Appellant's due process rights guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
were violated by the delay in filing state charges. 
In this case, as set forth in the facts above, the State's 
triggering event which prompted the State of Utah to file the 
charges in the present case was the dismissal of the federal 
Indictment by the United States District Judge upon speedy trial 
grounds. The Appellant was arrested on charges in this matter 
within hours of being released from federal custody. The 
prosecution of the state case was not delayed by any additional 
investigation which was necessary to identify additional suspects 
or to gain additional evidence to establish the Appellant's guilt. 
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The State could have filed charges immediately upon the arrest of 
the Appellant by the federal authorities, instead of delaying for 
approximately one year while the Appellant remained in federal 
custody. 
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 
L.Ed. 2d 752 (1977) held that where the delay in filing an 
Indictment, the delay does not constitute a violation of due 
process unless there is a showing that the prosecutor's delay 
"violates those fundamental concepts of justice which lie at the 
base of our civil and political institutions, and which define the 
communities' sense of fair play and decency." 431 U.S. at 790. As 
set forth in the argument in Point I above, this is not a case 
where the federal and state authorities were working independently 
of each other and were not aware of the efforts of the other. To 
the contrary/ this was a joint sting operation with the involvement 
of both federal and state officers. Appellant submits that it is 
fundamentally unfair and a demonstration of lack of fair play to 
allow the Appellant to sit in jail for a year under the federal 
Indictment and then, when the federal court provided constitutional 
relief for that delay, to initiate a state prosecution for the 
conduct arising from the same activity. 
In State v. Smith. 699 P.2d 711, the court found that the 
state's pre-accusation delay would not constitute reversible error 
unless the defendant could show some prejudice as a result of the 
delay. in Smith, the defendant was in custody on a parole 
violation during the delay following his arrest from October of 
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1981 until charges were filed in September of 1982. The court 
upheld the conviction in Smith since the Appellant did not show 
that he had been prejudiced by pretrial delay or that the 
prosecution had gained any tactical advantage as a result of the 
delay. (699 P.2d at 713) In the present case, in addition to the 
Appellant's being held in federal custody for over one year, a 
material witness became unavailable. The confidential informant 
Ross Argyle was unavailable at the time of the entrapment hearing 
in this matter. As set forth in the facts above, Appellant sought 
to secure his attendance for purposes of the trial and entrapment 
hearing, but the State, after being ordered to produce Argyle, 
could not locate him. As set forth in Appellant's Motion in 
attempting to secure the attendance of Argyle, there were 
conversations between the Appellant and Argyle which the Appellant 
claimed constituted entrapment and which were not taped. (A review 
of the transcriptions of the telephone conversations between the 
Appellant and Argyle introduced at the entrapment hearing clearly 
demonstrates that there had been previous conversations between the 
two prior to the taping) Further, there was confusion among the 
State's own witnesses as to the inducement which had been promised 
to Argyle in order to obtain his cooperation. Also in question is 
at what point he became a government agent. At the time of the 
hearing of the motion of the Appellant to secure Argyle as a 
material witness, there was no dispute as to whether he was a 
material witness. (The trial court, in an effort to justify denial 
of Appellant's motion to dismiss for the failure of the State to 
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comply with the order of the court to produce Argyle, later made a 
finding that Argyle was not a material witness on the grounds that 
the Appellant had not shown that his testimony was material) 
(Addendum, Exhibit "C" pp.14) See also United States v. Revada, 574 
F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1978) 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant submits that the delay was 
constitutionally unfair and a denial of his right to due process 
and speedy trial pursuant to the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Speedy Trial 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY NOT GRANTING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PRODUCE 
A MATERIAL WITNESS 
A. The Standard of Review. 
The standard of review in regard to this issue is that of a 
review for correctness. 
B. The trial court committed reversible error by not granting 
Appellant's motion to dismiss for failure of the State to produce 
a material witness. 
The Appellant filed a Motion to Secure Attendance of Out-of-
State Witness to obtain the presence of Ross Argyle, the State's 
informant and the person who first contacted the Appellant and 
discussed his coming to Utah. Appellant's Motion set forth the 
grounds for his request that Argyle had made representations to the 
Appellant which constituted entrapment, that Argyle was acting on 
behalf of law enforcement agencies, that Argyle was promised 
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substantial inducement which was conditional upon his successfully 
inducing Appellant into participation of illegal activities, and 
that without Argyle, the Appellant could not fully present his 
entrapment defense. (Addendum, Exhibit "D") 
Prior to the hearing on entrapment held by the court, the 
Appellant's counsel, the prosecution, and the court discussed the 
motion to secure the witness. The State's only objection was not 
that Argyle was not a material witness to the defense, but that the 
State did not want to be required to pay the witness fees since the 
Appellant, although indigent, was represented by private counsel. 
The State's attorney indicated that rather than have the court 
order the State to pay for the Appellant to have the witness 
appear, he would agree to have the witness present as the State's 
witness and that the State would produce him. (Hr. pp.5-6) 
Appellant7 counsel responded that the Appellant was not concerned 
with whether or not Argyle was a witness for the State or for the 
Appellant, the Appellant's concern was to have him before the court 
so that the full information concerning the transaction could be 
explored. The Appellant's counsel agreed to proceed with the 
entrapment hearing with the witnesses which were present and to 
then continue the hearing to the day prior to the trial on the 
condition that Argyle would then be present. (Hr. pp. 7-9) The 
court indicated that the court was inclined to grant Appellant's 
request, but found the suggestion of the State acceptable. The 
court, counsel for the State, and counsel for the Appellant then 
agreed that an order would be entered requiring the State to 
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produce Argyle. (Hr. pp. 9) 
On the day set for the continuation of the entrapment hearing, 
the State did not produce Argyle indicating they were unable to 
locate him. Appellant made a motion to dismiss based upon the 
failure of the State to comply with the order of the court to 
produce Argyle. The court took Appellant's motion under advisement 
and then made a ruling denying said motion. (Addendum, Exhibit "C") 
The grounds stated by the court for denying the motion to 
dismiss were that Argyle had not been demonstrated to be a material 
witness by the Appellant, therefore his Due Process and Sixth 
Amendment right to Compulsory Process had not been denied. 
(Addendum, Exhibit "C" pp. 13) Appellant argues that this 
reasoning by the court is flawed. There was no issue as to the 
materiality of the witness Argyle nor any challenge to the 
assertions of the Appellant as to his importance to his entrapment 
defense. Neither the court nor the State questioned his status as 
material to the Appellant. The statute under which the motion to 
secure was brought, Utah Code Ann. §77-21-3 is only applicable to 
material witnesses. The court as indicated above, had no question 
at the time of the hearing on the motion as to whether or not the 
witness was material and was inclined to grant the motion. Had the 
court or counsel for the State voiced such a concern at that time, 
and the court entered a finding that Argyle was not a material 
witness, the Appellant could have sought interlocutory relief. The 
court and the State should be bound by the State's agreement to 
take responsibility for the production of the witness. 
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The right of the criminal defendant to compulsory process is 
well established. The United States Supreme Court in Taylor v. 
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 98 L.Ed 2d 798, stated that "few rights are 
more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in 
his own defense." 484 U.S. at 410. The Supreme Court in United 
States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683, 41 L Ed 2d 1039 made the following 
observation: 
But this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of 
our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere 
more profoundly manifest than in our view that "the twofold 
aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer." Beraer v. United States. 295 US, at 88, 79 
L Ed 1314. We have elected to employ an adversary system of 
criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues 
before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts 
in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. 
The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments 
were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of 
the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and 
public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of 
all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. 
To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the 
function of courts that compulsory process be available for 
the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or 
by the defense. 418 US at 708-709. 
Appellant contends that the constitutional provisions of 
Article I, Section 12, also provides the Appellant with the right 
to compulsory process. Interestingly, the trial court cited State 
v. Schreuder, 712 P. 2d 264 (Utah 1985) as authority supporting the 
court's denial of the Appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to 
produce. Appellant suggests that under the reasoning of the 
appellate court in Schreuder, the trial court should have granted 
the motion to dismiss. The determination of materiality had 
already been established at the time the court ordered the state to 
produce Argyle. If the trial court had not decided at that time 
16 
that Argyle was a material witness subject to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann, §77-21-3, the court would have at that time simply 
made that ruling and denied the motion. The court made no findings 
or determination that the efforts of the State to locate the 
witness were adequate. There having been no evidence or claim of 
immateriality presented to the court by the State, the court's 
after-the-fact determination constitutes clear error and justifies 
reversal. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS UPON THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT 
A. The Standard of Review. 
The standard of review in regard to this issue is whether the 
decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous. 
B. The trial court committed reversible error in denying 
Appellant's Motion to dismiss upon the defense of entrapment. 
Appellant filed a Motion to dismiss the criminal prosecution 
in this matter upon the grounds that he was entrapped into the 
commission of the offense. The trial court held a hearing on the 
issue of entrapment on December 10, 1992. The Appellant filed a 
Motion to Secure Attendance of Out-of-State Witness pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §77-21-3 to obtain the presence of 
Ross Argyle, the informant who initially set up the contact with 
the Appellant and introduced him to law enforcement officers. (Hr. 
pp.4-5, 13-15) Appellant set forth in the Motion to Secure 
Attendance specific proffer as to the necessity of having the 
witness appear. The Motion clearly indicated that Argyle was 
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necessary for the Appellant to establish the defense of entrapment 
since Argyle made the initial contacts with the Appellant. 
(Addendum, Exhibit "D") The State took the position that they were 
as interested in having the witness Argyle present as was the 
Appellant and proposed that the State be responsible to locate and 
produce Argyle to testify at the continuation of the evidentiary 
hearing on entrapment. (Hr. pp. 9) The court then issued an order 
which required the State to produce the witness Argyle at the time 
of the continuation of the evidentiary hearing set for March 8, 
1993. (Addendum, Exhibit "E")(Hg. pp. 9) Appellant agreed to allow 
the State to proceed with the witnesses with the exception of 
Argyle upon the condition and agreement between court and counsel 
that the court would make no ruling until after the additional 
witness had testified. (Hr. pp. 7-8) 
The State called Provo City police officer Egan who testified 
that Ross Argyle had approached law enforcement officers with the 
intent of providing information concerning those involved in 
illicit drug distribution in return for financial consideration and 
reduction of a jail sentence. Officer Egan was unsure of the 
amount of money involved or the specifics of the reduction of jail 
time offered to Argyle as consideration for his involvement. (Hr. 
pp. 16-17) Provo City officer Parker was then called as the person 
whom Argyle had first approached with the information. At the time 
Argyle approached Parker, he indicated that the Appellant was out 
of the state of Utah. (Hr. pp. 21) Parker testified that the 
agreement with Argyle was that he would receive a sum of money in 
18 
the event he was successful in introducing a DEA agent to Appellant 
and upon the introduction being "fruitful." Parker testified that 
he did not know how much Argyle was offered or whether he was 
offered consideration in the form of reduction of jail time. (Hr. 
pp. 30-31) 
Officer Parker also testified that at the time DEA agent 
Illsley and Provo police contacted Appellant, Appellant was in the 
state of Nevada, and did not have the money for a bus ticket to 
come to Utah. Further, he testified that all of the money to be 
expended in connection with obtaining chemicals, equipment and the 
site for the criminal activity was provided by the law enforcement 
agents, including food and beer. (Hr. pp. 35-38) Parker stated 
that the joint law enforcement team offered Appellant $10,000.00 to 
come into the state of Utah and show them how to make 
methamphetamine. (Hr. pp. 38) 
The State represented by proffer that the State did not 
participate in the reduction of any pending jail sentences facing 
the informant Argyle, but that the State did agree to waive any 
extradition costs associated with his cases. Counsel for the 
Appellant proffered that the court records showed in Case No. CR-
8816 there was a recommendation from the Division of Corrections 
that Argyle serve nine (9) months for the probation violation, but 
that the court did not sentence Argyle to any jail time as a result 
of his probation violation. Counsel also indicated that it was his 
understanding that Argyle had also been sentenced to serve 120 days 
on a city case which was not served. (Hr. pp. 43-46) 
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Charles Illsley, the DEA agent involved, testified that he was 
aware that in addition to $2,000.00 cash payment by the DEA, that 
the Provo City officers were going to contact authorities to gain 
consideration for Argyle in regard to pending jail time. (Hr. pp. 
87-88) He further testified that Argyle would not be paid any of 
the $2,000.00 unless he was successful in convincing the Appellant 
to come to Utah and set up the clandestine laboratory. (Hr. pp. 89-
90) 
Illsley also testified that his agency had no prior interest 
or information concerning the involvement of Appellant in illicit 
drug activities prior to being contacted by Provo City officers. 
(Hr. pp. 75) He testified that he was aware that the Appellant did 
not even have the money to travel to Utah and that part of the 
arrangement was that the law enforcement team wired Appellant the 
money to purchase a bus ticket to Wendover, Utah, where agent 
Illsley picked him up in a Corvette and brought him into Utah 
County to the site which had been arranged by the officers. (Hr. 
pp. 63) Illsley indicated that the Appellant did not provide any 
funds to purchase chemicals, materials or any other expenses 
involved in the activity. The housing, chemicals, equipment, and 
every other item necessary was purchased by the law enforcement 
team. (Hr. pp. 85) 
Illsley testified that the Appellant was to receive some share 
from the sale of any drugs produced and the sum of $10,000.00 for 
showing Illsley how to manufacture methamphetamine. He was shown 
$10,000.00 in cash after arriving at the site. (Hr. pp. 83-84) 
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At the conclusion of the evidence presented by the State, the 
court recessed the matter until March 8, 1993, at which time the 
informant Argyle was to be present. (Hr. pp.105) At that time, the 
State indicated that they had been unsuccessful in attempts to 
locate Ross Argyle. Counsel for Appellant then moved in open court 
to dismiss the Information due to the failure of the State to 
produce the witness Argyle as ordered by the court. (Addendum, 
Exhibit "E") 
The test to be applied to determine whether a particular 
defendant has been entrapped is an objective standard set forth in 
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496. The objective test focuses not upon 
the propensities and predisposition of a specific defendant to 
commit the crime, but upon the police conduct involved in the case. 
State v. Cripps, 692 P. 747 (Utah 1984); State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 
315 (Ct. App. 1987) . The Supreme Court has stated that "appeals 
based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or 
offers of inordinate sums of money, are examples, depending on an 
evaluation of the circumstances in each case, of what might 
constitute prohibited police conduct." Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503. 
Appellant submits that in the present case, the government 
conduct fails the objective test. The government was obviously 
dealing with an individual who had no money, not even enough for 
bus fare to come to the state of Utah. There was no indication as 
set forth above, that the Appellant was a person on any list of 
suspected drug dealers or a person whom posed any special threat. 
The government in this case brought the Appellant into the state of 
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Utah and into Utah County in particular when he had not the funds 
or means to do so left to his own devices. The Appellant did not 
contact the informant Argyle, Argyle contacted Appellant and 
Argyle, acting for the government, urged Appellant to come into 
Utah to be involved in criminal conduct. Appellant still could not 
come to Utah since he had no transportation. Neither Argyle nor 
Appellant without the assistance of the government had the 
resources to commit the crime. The government did offer an 
"inordinate" sum of money from the standpoint of the Appellant in 
offering $10,000.00 for merely showing the agent how to manufacture 
methamphetamine and the prospect of even greater amounts in 
proceeds from the illegal conduct. The fact that the government 
agents felt it necessary to show the Appellant $10,000.00 in cash 
prior to his performing any part of the process demonstrates the 
intent of the government to use the lure of large amounts of cash 
to induce the Appellant to proceed with the illegal activities. 
The conduct on the part of the government in this case constituted 
entrapment as a matter of law and the trial court should have 
dismissed the Information on that ground. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that for all or any of the foregoing 
reasons, his conviction should be reversed, or in the alternative, 
the matter should be remanded for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of December, 1994. 
MICHAEL D. E£PLIN ( ' 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION 21 USCS § 841 
the 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted 
Nov. 10, 1978] may submit such report any time up to 97 days after 
such date of enactment. 
"(3) Until otherwise provided by the Attorney General by regula-
tion, the information required to be reported by a person under 
section 310(a)(1) of the Controlled Substances Act (as added by 
section 202(a)(2) of this title) subsec. (a)(1) of this section with 
respect to the person's distribution, sale, or importation of piperidine 
shall— 
"(A) be the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) 
of such section, and 
"(B) except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, be 
reported not later than seven days after the date of such distribu-
tion, sale, or importation.". 
Regulations for piperidine reporting. Act Nov. 10, 1978, P. L. 95-633, 
Title II, § 203(b), 92 Stat. 3777, required the Attorney General to 
publish proposed interim regulations for piperidine reporting under 
subsec. (a) of this section not later than 30 days after enactment on 
Nov. 10, 1978, and final interim regulations not later than 75 days after 
enactment on Nov. 10, 1978, such final interim regulations to be 
effective on and after the 91st day after such enactment. 
Report to President and Congress on effectiveness of 21 USCS §§ 801 
et seq. Act Nov. 10, 1978, P. L. 95-633, Title II, § 203(c), 92 Stat. 
3777, required the Attorney General to analyze and evaluate the 
impact and effectiveness of the amendments made by 21 USCS §§801 
et seq. and report to the President and Congress not later than Mar. 1, 
1980. 
Repeal of this section. Act Sept. 26, 1980, P. L. 96-359, § 8(b), 94 Stat. 
1194, deleted § 203(d) of Act Nov. 10, 1978, P. L. 95-633, 92 Stat. 
3777, which would have repealed this section, effective Jan. 1, 1981. 
OFFENSES AND PENALTIES 
§ 841. P roh ib i ted acts A 
(a) Unlawful acts. Except as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful 
for any person knowingly or intentionally— 
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or 
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute 
or dispense, a counterfeit substance. 
(b) Penalties. Except as otherwise provided in section 405 [21 USCS 
§ 845], any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be 
sentenced as follows: 
(1)(A) In the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or II which is 
a narcotic drug, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment of not more than 15 years, a fine of not more than $25,000, or 
161 
D R U G A B U S E P R E V E N T I O N 21 USCS § 846 
Forms: 
15 Federal Procedural Forms L Ed, Statutes of Limitation, and Other 
Time Limits § 61:32. 
Texts: 
Bailey and Rothblatt, Handling Narcotic and Drug Cases. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
Age of distributee must be alleged in indict- of crimes, in deciding at what point to fix 
ment before enhanced sentence under 21 USCS sentence under § 841(b), and whether to make 
§ 845(a) may be imposed. United States v Moore some of sentences consecutive, even though 
(1976) 176 App DC 309, 540 F2d 1088, later judge was not entitled to have recourse to provi-
app 183 App DC 461, 564 F2d 482. sions of 21 USCS § 845(a) because sales to 
In imposing sentence for violation of 21 USCS minors had not been specifically charged and 
§ 841(a), judge is entitled to take into account proved. United States v Moore (1977) 183 App 
juvenile nature of victims, and hence seriousness DC 461, 564 F2d 482. 
§ 846. Attempt and conspiracy 
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any oflfense defined in 
this title is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not 
exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commis-
sion of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. 
(Oct. 27, 1970, P. L. 91-513, Title II, Part D, § 406, 84 Stat. 1265.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
References in text: 
"This title", referred to in this section, is Title II of Act Oct. 27, 1970, 
P. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242, which appears generally as 21 USCS 
§§801 et seq. For full classification of such Title, consult USCS Tables 
volumes. 
Effective date of section: 
Act Oct. 27, 1970, P. L. 91-513, Title II, Part G, § 704(a), 84 Stat. 
1284, which appears as 21 USCS § 801 note, provided that this section 
is effective on the first day of the seventh calendar month that begins 
after the day immediately preceding enactment on Oct. 27, 1970. 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Am JUT: 
16 Am Jur 2d, Conspiracy §§30, 31. 
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 167, 266, 363. 
25 Am Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons § 37. 
Am Jur Trials: 
Handling the Defense in a Conspiracy Prosecution, 20 Am Jur Trials, 
p. 356. 
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Georgia WILLIAM FEW, 
ABR BALDWIN. 
In Convention Monday September 17th 1787. 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. 
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved. 
That, the preceding Constitution be laid before the 
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is 
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should after-
wards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, 
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the 
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent 
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting 
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof 
to the United States in Congress assembled. 
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, 
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall 
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in 
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Elec-
tors should be appointed by the States which shall 
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Elec-
tors should assemble to vote for the President, and 
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings un-
der this Constitution. That after such Publication the 
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and 
Representatives elected: That the Electors should 
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the Presi-
dent, and should transmit their Votes certified, 
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution re-
quires, to the Secretary of the United States in Con-
gress assembled, that the Senators and Representa-
tives should convene at the Time and Place assigned; 
that the Senators should appoint a President of the 
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and 
counting the Votes for President; and. that after he 
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the Pres-
ident, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this 
Constitution. 
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention. 
Go. WASHINGTON. Presidt. \V. JACKSON. Secretary 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X (BILL OF RIGHTS! 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII 
AMENDMENT I 
1 Religious and polit ical freedoni.l 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
(Right to b e a r a rms. ] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
curity of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
1 U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and seizures.! 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
(Criminal ac t ions — Provis ions concern ing — 
Due p rocess of law and jus t compensa t ion 
c lauses . ] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
A M E N D M E N T VI 
(Rights of accused . ] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
A M E N D M E N T VII 
(Trial by j u r y in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
A M E N D M E N T VIII 
IBail — P u n i s h m e n t . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
Present The Slates of (Quar t e r ing soldiers.} 
58-37c-4 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 9e 
(e) making any false statement in any ap-
plication for license, in any record to be kept, 
or on any report submitted as required under 
this chapter; 
(f) with the intent of causing the evasion 
of the recordkeeping or reporting require-
ments of this chapter and rules related to 
this chapter, receiving or distributing any 
listed controlled substance precursor chemi-
cal in any manner designed so that the mak-
ing of records or filing of reports required 
under this chapter is not required; 
(g) failing to take immediate steps to com-
ply with licensure, reporting, or recordkeep-
ing requirements of this chapter because of 
lack of knowledge of those requirements, 
upon becoming informed of the require-
ments; 
(h) presenting false or fraudulent identifi-
cation where or when receiving or purchas-
ing a listed controlled substance precursor 
chemical; 
(i) creating a chemical mixture for the 
purpose of evading any licensure, reporting 
or recordkeeping requirement of this chapter 
or rules related to this chapter, or receiving 
a chemical mixture created for that purpose; 
(j) if the person is at least 18 years of age, 
employing, hiring, using, persuading, induc-
ing, enticing, or coercing another person un-
der 18 years of age to violate any provision of 
this chapter, or assisting in avoiding detec-
tion or apprehension for any violation of this 
chapter by any federal, state, or local law 
enforcement official; and 
(k) obtaining or attempting to obtain or to 
possess any controlled substance precursor 
or any combination of controlled substance 
precursors knowing or having a reasonable 
cause to believe that the controlled sub-
stance precursor is intended to be used in the 
unlawful manufacture of any controlled sub-
stance. 
(11) "Unprofessional conduct" as defined in 
Section 58-1-102 and as may be further defined 
by rule includes the following: 
(a) violation of any provision of this chap-
ter, the Controlled Substance Act of this 
state or any other state, or the Federal Con-
trolled Substance Act; and 
(b) refusing to allow agents or representa-
tives of the division or authorized law en-
forcement personnel to inspect inventories or 
controlled substance precursors or records or 
reports relating to purchases and sales or 
distribution of controlled substance precur-
sors as such records and reports are required 
under this chapter. \9*x\ 
5S-37C-4. Board . 
(1) There is hereby established a Controlled Sub-
stance Precursor Advisory Board which shall consist 
of four individuals representing distributors and pur-
chasers of controlled substance precursors and one 
member from the general public. 
(2) The board shall be appointed and serve in ac-
cordance with Section 58-1-201. 
(3) The duties and responsibilities of the board 
shall be in accordance with Sections 5S-1-202 and 
f i«-1.9fV« |<K);j 
5S-37c-5. Responsib i l i ty of Depar tment of Com 
m e r c e — Delegat ion to the Division oi 
O c c u p a t i o n a l and Professional Licens-
ing — R u l e m a k i n g au thor i ty of the di-
vis ion. 
(1) Responsibility for the enforcement of the licens-
ing and reporting provisions of this chapter shall be 
with the Department of Commerce. 
(2) The executive director shall delegate specific 
responsibility within the department to the Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
i.-J» The division shall make, adopt, amend, and re-
peal rules necessary for the proper administration 
and enforcement of this chapter. 1992 
58-37c-G. Division du t i e s . 
The division shall be responsible for the licensing 
and reporting provisions of this chapter and those 
duties shall include: 
(1) providing for a system of licensure of regu-
lated distributors and regulated purchasers; 
(2) refusing to renew a license or revoking, 
suspending, restricting, placing on probation, is-
suing a private or public letter of censure or rep-
rimand, or imposing other appropriate action 
against a license; 
(3) with respect to the licensure and reporting 
provisions of this chapter, investigating or caus-
ing to be investigated any violation of this chap-
ter by any person and to cause, when necessary, 
appropriate administrative action with respect to 
the license of that person; 
(A) presenting evidence obtained from investi-
gations conducted by appropriate county attor-
neys and the Office of the Attorney General for 
civil or criminal prosecution or for administra-
tive action against a licensee; 
(5) conducting hearings for the purpose of re-
voking, suspending, placing on probation, or im-
posing other appropriate administrative action 
against the license of regulated distributors or 
regulated purchasers in accordance with the pro-
visions of Title 58, Chapter 1, Division of Occupa-
tional and Professional Licensing Act, and Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act; 
(6) assisting all other law enforcement agen-
cies of the state in enforcing all laws regarding 
controlled substance precursors; 
(7) specifying reports, frequency of reports, 
and conditions under which reports are to be sub-
mitted and to whom reports are to be submitted 
by regulated distributors and regulated pur-
chasers with respect to transactions involving 
threshold amounts of controlled substance pre-
cursors; and 
(8) performing all other functions necessary to 
fulfill division duties and responsibilities as out-
lined under this chapter or rules adopted pursu-
ant to this chapter. 1992 
58-37e-7. License c lass i f ica t ions . 
(1) The division shall issue to persons qualified un-
der the provisions of this chapter and rules adopted a 
license in the classifications: 
(a) controlled substance precursor distributor; 
or 
(b) controlled substance precursor purchaser. 
(2) It is unlawful for a person to engage in the dis-
tribution, sale, transfer, or in the purchase or obtain-
ing of a controlled substance precursor in a regulated 
transaction without being licensed or excepted from 
licensure under this chapter. 1992 
So OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 58-37-8 
a,rCd and labeled in compliance with the require-
ments of $ 305 of the Federal Comprehensive Drug 
-\buse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. 
(2) No person except a pharmacist for the purpose 
of filling a prescription shall alter, deface, or remove 
any label affixed by the manufacturer. 
(3) Whenever a pharmacist sells or dispenses any 
controlled substance on a prescription issued by a 
practitioner, he shall affix to the container in which 
the substance is sold or dispensed a label showing his 
own name, address, and registry number, or the 
name, address, :u\d registry number of the pharma-
cist or pharmacy owner for whom he is lawfully act-
ing: the prescription number, the name of the patient, 
or if the patient is an animal, the name of the owner 
of the animal and the species of the animal; the name 
of the practitioner by whom the prescription was 
written; any directions stated on the prescription and 
anv directions required by rules and regulations pro-
mulgated by the department. 
No person shall alter the face or remove any label 
so long as any of the original contents remain. 
(4) An individual to whom or for whose use any 
controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dis-
pensed by a practitioner and the owner of any animal 
for which any substance has been prescribed, sold, or 
dispensed by a veterinarian may lawfully possess it 
only in the container in which it was delivered to him 
by the person selling or dispensing it. 19K6 
58-37-8. P roh ib i t ed ac ts — Penal t ies . 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except, as authorized by this chapter, it is 
unlawful for any person to knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or 
to possess with intent to produce, manufac-
ture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or ar-
range to distribute a controlled or counter-
feit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the 
course of his business as a sales representa-
tive of a manufacturer or distributor of sub-
stances listed in Schedules II through V ex-
cept that he may possess such controlled sub-
stances when they are prescribed to him by a 
licensed practitioner; or 
(i v) possess a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance with intent to distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (lKa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or 
II is guilty of a second degree felony and 
upon a second or subsequent conviction of 
Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III 
or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third de-
gree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection 
is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third de-
gree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is u n lawful-
(i) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to possess or use a controlled sub-
stance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a practi-
tioner while acting in the course of his pro-
fessional practice, or as otherwise authorized 
by this subsection; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or per-
son in control of any building, room, tene-
ment, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them 
to be occupied by persons unlawfully possess-
ing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to be present where controlled sub-
stances are being used or possessed in viola-
tion of this chapter and the use or possession 
is open, obvious, apparent, and not concealed 
from those present; however, a person may 
not be convicted under this subsection if the 
evidence shows that he did not use the sub-
stance himself or advise, encourage, or assist 
anyone else to do so; any incidence of prior 
unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this de-
fense; 
liv) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to possess an altered or forged pre-
scription or written order for a controlled 
substance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this 
chapter knowingly and intentionally to pre-
scribe, administer, or dispense a controlled 
substance to a juvenile, without first obtain-
ing the consent required in Section 78-14-5 
of a parent, guardian, or person standing in 
loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases 
of an emergency; for purposes of this subsec-
tion, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in 
Section 78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any 
physical condition requiring the administra-
tion of a controlled substance for immediate 
relief of pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this 
chapter knowingly and intentionally to pre-
scribe or administer dosages of a controlled 
substance in excess of medically recognized 
quantities necessary to treat the ailment, 
malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, adminis-
ter, or dispense any controlled substance to 
another person knowing that the other per-
son is using a false name, address, or other 
personal information for the purpose of se-
curing the same, 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (2Ka)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds 
or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule 1 or 
II, or marijuana, if the amount is more than 
16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty 
of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in 
the form of an extracted resin from any part 
of the plant, and the amount is more than 
one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor. 
(C) A n v n o -
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viction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of 
tha t included offense, the verdict or judgment of con-
viction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment 
of conviction entered for the included offense, without 
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the 
defendant. 1974 
76-1-403. F o r m e r prosecut ion b a r r i n g subse-
q u e n t p rosecu t ion for offense ou t of 
s a m e ep isode . 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or 
more offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, 
a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an of-
fense that was or should have been tried under 
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution: 
and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or 
judgment for the defendant that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that nec-
essarily required a determination inconsis-
tent with a fact that must be established to 
secure conviction in the subsequent prosecu-
tion. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted 
in a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a 
determination tha t there was insufficient evidence to 
warran t conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser 
included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense 
even though the conviction for the lesser included 
offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or va-
cated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted 
in a judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of 
supporting a judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by 
the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecu-
tion if the termination takes place before the verdict, 
is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and 
takes place after a jury has been impanelled and 
sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is 
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, ter-
mination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; 
or 
(bl The defendant waives his ri^ht to object to 
the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record 
tha t the termination is necessary because. 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed 
with the trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceed-
ing not at tr ibutable to the state that would 
make any judgment entered upon a verdict 
reversible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the 
courtroom not attributable to the state 
makes it impossible to proceed with the trial 
without injustice to the defendant or the 
state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a 
verdict; or 
(v) False s tatements of a juror on voir dire 
prevent a fair trial. 1974 
76-1-404. C o n c u r r e n t j u r i sd i c t i on — P r o s e c u -
tion in o t h e r j u r i sd i c t ion b a r r i n g pros-
ecu t ion in s t a t e . 
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission 
of one or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of this state and of another jurisdiction, federal 
or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a 
bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the 
former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, convic-
tion, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are 
defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent 
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses. 1973 
76-1-405. S u b s e q u e n t p ro secu t i on not ba r red — 
C i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not 
be barred under the following circumstances: 
(1) The former prosecution was procured by 
the defendant without the knowledge of the pros-
ecuting attorney bringing the subsequent prose-
cution and with intent to avoid the sentence that 
might otherwise be imposed; or 
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judg-
ment of guilt held invalid in a subsequent pro-
ceeding on writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or 
similar collateral attack. 1973 
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76-1-501. P r e s u m p t i o n of i nnocence — "Ele-
m e n t of the of fense" def ined. 
(Ii A defendant in a criminal proceeding is pre-
sumed to be innocent until each element of the of-
fense charged against him is proved beyond a reason-
able doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the 
offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, a t tendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or for-
bidden in the definition of the offense; 
<b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not 
elements of the offense but shall be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 1973 
76-1-502. Nega t ing de fense by al legat ion or 
proof — When no t r e q u i r e d . 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a de-
fense: 
ment, or other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a 
result of evidence presented at trial, either 
by the prosecution or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, 
and the defendant has presented evidence of 
such affirmative defense. 1973 
76-1-503. P r e s u m p t i o n of fact. 
An evidentiary presumption established by this 
code or other penal statute has the following conse-
quences: 
(1) When evidence of facts which support the 
presumption exist, the issue of the existence of 
the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury 
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Section 
77-21-3. Procedure to secure attendance of wit-
ness from without state. 
77-21-4. Fees. 
77-21-5. Witnesses not subject to arrest or service 
of process. 
77-21-1. S h o r t title — Const ruc t ion . 
This chapter may be cited as the "Uniform Act to 
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a 
State in Criminal Proceedings." It shall be inter-
preted and construed as to effectuate its general pur-
pose to make uniform the law of the states which 
enact it. i*so 
77-21-2. P r o c e d u r e to secure a t t e n d a n c e in an-
o t h e r s t a te . 
If a judge of a court of record in any state, which by 
its laws has made provisions for commanding persons 
within that state to attend and testify in this state, 
certifies under the seal of the court that there is a 
criminal prosecution pending in the court, or thai a 
grand jury investigation has commenced or is about 
to commence, that a person being within this state is 
a material witness in the prosecution or grand jury 
investigation and that his presence will be required 
for a specified number of days, upon presentation of 
the certificate to any judge of a court of record within 
this state in the county in which the person is found, 
the judge shall fix a time and place for a hearing and 
make an order directing the witness to appear at a 
time and place certain for the hearing. 
If at a hearing the judge determines that the wit-
ness is material and necessary, that it will not cause 
undue hardship to the witness to be compelled to at-
tend and testify in the prosecution or grand jury in-
vestigation in the other state, and that the laws of the 
state in which the prosecution is pending, or grand 
jury investigation has commenced or is about to com-
mence, and of any other state through which the wit-
ness may be required to pass by ordinary course of 
travel, will give him protection from arrest and the 
service of civil and criminal process, he shall issue a 
summons, with a copy of the certificate attached, di-
recting the witness to attend and testify in the court 
where the prosecution is pending, or where a grand 
jury investigation has commenced or is about to com-
mence at a time and place specified in the summons. 
In any such hearing the certificate shall be prima 
facie evidence of all the facts stated therein. 
If the certificate recommends that the witness be 
taken into immediate custody and delivered to an of-
ficer of the requesting state to assure his attendance 
in the requesting state, the judge may. in lieu of noti-
fication of the hearing, direct the witness to be imme-
diately brought before him for the hearing, and the 
judge at the hearing being satisfied of the desirability 
of custody and delivery, for which determination the 
certificate shall be prima facie proof of desirability, 
may, in lieu of issuing subpoena or summons, order 
the witness to be immediately taken into custody and 
delivered to an officer of the requesting state. 
If the witness who is summoned as above provided, 
after being paid or tendered by some properly autho-
rized person the sum of 20 cents a mile for each mile 
by the ordinary traveled route to and from the court 
where the prosecution is pending and $30 for each 
day he is required to travel and attend as a witness, 
fails without good cause to attend and testify as di-
rected in the summons, he shall be punished in the 
manner provided for the punishment of an>' witness 
who disobeys a summons issued from a court of record 
in this state. i9s<i 
77-21-3. P r o c e d u r e to secure a t tendance of wit-
ness from wi thout s tate . 
If a person in any state, which by its laws has made 
provision for commanding persons within its borders 
to attend and testify in criminal prosecutions, or 
grand jury investigations commenced or about to 
commence, in this state, is a material witness in a 
prosecution pending in a court of record in this state, 
or in a grand jury investigation which has com-
menced or is about to commence, a judge of the court 
may issue a certificate under the seal of the court 
stating these facts and specifying the number of days 
the witness will be required. The certificate may in-
clude a recommendation that the witness be taken 
into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of 
this state to assure his attendance in this state. This 
certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court of 
record in the county in which the witness is found 
If the witness is summoned to attend and testify in 
this state he shall be tendered such sum as may be 
required by the laws of the state in which the witness 
is found, not exceeding the sum of 20 cents a mile for 
each mile by the ordinary traveled route to and from 
the court where the prosecution is pending and $30 
for each day that he is required to travel and attend 
as a witness. A witness who has appeared in accor-
dance with the provisions of the summons shall not 
be required to remain within this state a longer pe-
riod of time than the period mentioned in the certifi-
cate unless otherwise ordered by the court. If the wit-
ness, after coming into this state, fails without good 
cause to attend and testify as directed in the sum-
mons, he shall be punished in the manner provided 
for the punishment of any witness who disobeys a 
summons issued from a court of record in this state. 
198<) 
77-21-4. F e e s . 
W h e n e v e r a j u d g e of a c o u r t of record o( t h i s s t a t e 
i s sues a cer t i f ica te u n d e r t h e provis ions of t h i s chap-
t e r to ob ta in t h e a t t e n d a n c e of a w i tnes s for t he prose-
cu t ion from w i t h o u t t h e s t a t e in a c r imina l prosecu-
t ion or g r a n d j u r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n commenced or abou t 
to c o m m e n c e h e sha l l d e s i g n a t e the re in a su i t ab l e 
peace officer of t h i s s t a t e to p r e s e n t the cert i f icate to 
t h e proper officer or t r i b u n a l of t h e s l a t e where in the 
w i t n e s s is found a n d to t e n d e r to t he wi tness h is per 
t h e m and m i l e a g e fees. 
T h e officer sha l l e x h i b i t t h e cert i f icate to t h e 
coun ty a u d i t o r of t h e c o u n t y in which the c r i m i n a l 
p roceed ing is p e n d i n g a n d t h e a u d i t o r shall d r a w his 
w a r r a n t upon t h e coun ty t r e a s u r e r in favor of t he 
officer in t h e a m o u n t to be t e n d e r e d the wi tness . T h e 
officer sha l l be l iab le upon h i s official bond for t h e 
p roper d ispos i t ion of t h e m o n e y received 
In all cases in wh ich t h e officer is requi red to t r ave l 
in o r d e r to p r e s e n t t h e ce r t i f i ca te a n d tender fees, h is 
a c t u a l a n d neces sa ry t r a v e l i n g e x p e n s e s shall be paid 
ou t of t he fund from which w i t n e s s e s for the prosecu-
t ion in t h e c r i m i n a l p roceed ing a r e paid IHHO 
77-21-5. Witnesses not subject to arrest or ser-
vice of p rocess . 
If a person comes into this state in obedience to a 
summons directing him to attend and testify in this 
state he shall not, while in this state pursuant to such 
summons, be subject to arrest or the sen-ice of pro-
cess, civil or criminal, in connection with matters 
which arose before his entrance into this state under 
the summons. 
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tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence o r 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
ofilce of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of i 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court. WKH 
78-2a-3. C o u r t of Appea l s jur i sd ic t ion . 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess n ecessa rv: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission. State Tax 
Commission, Hoard of Stale Lands. Board of Oil. 
Gas. and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies, and 
Oil a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-4 6a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
te) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(0 appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
ig) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs >ought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases in-
volving a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child cus-
tody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b. Administrative 
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 1994 
78-2a-4. Review of ac t ions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court. 19^ 
78-2a-5. Locat ion of C o u r t of Appeals . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in 
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform 
any of its functions in any location within the state. 
1986 
C H A P T E R 3 
D IST RICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when circuit and district court 
merged. 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-.M1.5 State District Court Administrative 
System. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.:"). Costs of svstem 
78-3-13. Repealed. ' 
78-3-13.4. Counties joining court system — Pro-
cedure — Facilities — Salaries. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and 
fines. 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to 
counties 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short 
title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Mem-
bers — Terms and election — Re-
sponsibilities — Reports 
78-3-21.5. Data bases for judicial boards 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — 
Duties 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Ap-
pointment — Qualifications — Sal-
ary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, du-
ties, and responsibilities. 
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(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, des-
ignated by statute as one for which bail may be 
denied, if there is substantial evidence to support 
the charge and the court finds by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the person would consti-
tute a substantial danger to any other person or 
to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdic-
tion of the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend-
ing appeal only as prescribed by law. MSS (2nd s.s.i 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. IH«M; 
Sec. 10. (Trial by jury.J 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. IKIK; 
Sec. II. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party. IH;K; 
Sec. 12. (Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopard v for the same offense. 
1896 
(Rights of accused persons.] (Pro-
posed. ] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a pre-
liminary examination, the function of that examina-
tion is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing 
in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable 
hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at an>' preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceed-
ing with respect to release of the defendant if appro-
priate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or 
ru le . |1994| 
Sec. 13. (Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.J 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment. The for-
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. (Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.1 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. J F r e e d o m of speech and of the press — 
Libel. 1 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the 
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party 
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. (No imprisonment for debt — Excep-
tion.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. (Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec . 18. (Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im-
pairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
AO 142 <*•'. ia/t« "*«*•«! for Arrttt 
^nt ieh ^tntzs ^ t s t r tc t (Enuri 
CENTRAL D I V I S I O N DISTRICT OF. UTAH 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
V. 
JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS 
WARRANT FOR ARREST 
CASE NUMBER : ^,-^\-^V^-V\ 
To: The United States Marshal 
and any Authorized United States Officer 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to ^^rest JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS 
and bring him or her forthwith to the nearest magistrate to answer a(n) 
HJ Indictment C Information XjX] Complaint • Order of court D Violation Notice C Probation Violation Petition 
charging him o* her with
 (bfief desCr.ot.on of offense* 
ATTEMPT TO MANUFACTURE 
METHAMPHETAMINE 
in violation of j i t le . 21 
RON.\LD N. BOYCE n 
United States Code, Section(s). 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d 8 4 6 
Name of !6«uing Officer / 
Signature of Issuing Officer ' f 
United States Magistrate Judge 
Title of Issuing Officer 
A u g u s t 8 , 1 9 9 1 , S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 
Date and Location ~~ 
Sail fixed at $. by. 
Name of Judicial Officer 
RETURN 
This warrant was received and executed with the arrest of the above-named defendant at. 
EXHIBIT "B» 
•^ . i = m 
w AL?G 2 ,• 1<£2 
OFF' r* «*- *- — 
DAVID J. JORDAN, United States Attorney (#1751) 
DAVID J. SCHWENDIMAN, Assistant United States Attorney, (/: 
Attorneys for the United States of America cc/; -j ' 
476 United States Courthouse 
350 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 ,. ~ < ^ 
Telephone: (801) 524-5682 '1A,-:r. / "3 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DIVISION, DISTRICT OF UTAH 
•• c, 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
91-CR-193G 
ORDER 
On August 25, 1992, a f ter reviewing b r i e f s and hear ing 
argument on t h i s matter, the court hereby d i s m i s s e s t h e 
indictment aga ins t the defendant with prejudice pursuant t o 18 
U.S.C. §3162. 
DATED t h i s 2± day of 1992 . 
Copies mailed 9/4/92ch: 
David J . Schwendiman, AUSA 
Manny Garcia, Esq. 
USMS 
Probation 
BY THE COURT: 
hr^i i^a^ 
MAS GREENE, Judge 
States District Court 
EXHIBIT »C" 
RECEIVED >:AR - ^ 1993 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 




Case No. 921400455 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for 
Entrapment. A hearing was held on November 16, 1992 concerning the pending motions. 
Additional memoranda were filed and on December 10, 1992, the Motion to Dismiss was 
submitted for decision. On that same day a hearing was held concerning defendant's Motion 
for Entrapment. Testimony was taken and evidence was received. The hearing was 
continued until March 8, 1993 to take additional testimony and to entertain closing 
arguments. The Court, having heard the evidence and witnesses in support of their 
respective positions, having carefully reviewed the file, and being fully advised in the 




Defendant was arrested on August 7, 1991 and indicted by a federal grand jury on 
August 15, 1991 on one count of Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine. This arrest 
was the result of a drug task force effort involving the D.E.A. and local law enforcement 
officers. No other charges were brought in U.S. District Court, for the District of Utah. 
Prior to trial, the federal charges were eventually dismissed based upon a violation the 
Federal Speedy Trial Act and an order granting the dismissal was filed on September 2, 
1992. 
On August 25, 1992, defendant was arrested on the State charges pending in this 
case. Counsel was appointed for defendant. The Preliminary Hearing was conducted on 
September 8, 1992, and defendant was bound over to this Court. On September 29, 1992, 
defendant was arraigned and asserted his right to a speed} trial. The Court accordingly set 
trial within thirty days to begin on October 13, 1992. 
Defendant filed a number of pro se motions between September 25, 1992 and 
December 8, 1992. On October 5, 1992, counsel for defendant filed a Motion for 
Entrapment and accompanying memorandum. On October 9, 1992, the Court held a 
conference call. The topic of the call was to discuss the original trial date in light of the 
defendant's Entrapment motion and to explore possible conflicts of interest. The Court then 
struck the October 13, 1992 trial date and set the matter for hearing on October 13, 1992. 
On October 13, 1992, the trial date was set for December 10, 1992. Defense counsel was to 
file any additional motions by October 19, 1992 and a hearing on all pending motions was 
set for October 28, 1992. 
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On October 28, 1992, this matter came before the Court on the pending motions. 
Defense counsel indicated that he intended to file additional motions and had not yet done so. 
This Court then extended the time for defense counsel to file additional motions until October 
30, 1992. At the October 28, 1992 hearing, defendant refused to waive any constitutional 
rights which might be affected by the Court's action. On November 13, 1992, three days 
before the scheduled hearing, defense counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss based on four 
issues: (1) double jeopardy; (2) subsequent prosecution for the same criminal episode; (3) 
concurrent jurisdiction; and (4) violation of right to a speedy trial. Shortly after this motion 
was filed, defendant retained Michael Esplin, Esq. to represent him in this case. Defendant's 
new counsel requested more time to prepare for trial and time to supplement the motion to 
dismiss and motion for entrapment made by the public defender's office. The Court then 
struck the second trial date and set the Entrapment motion for hearing on December 10, 
1992. 
On December 10, 1992, defendant's entrapment hearing came before this Court. The 
State proceeded with its case. The hearing was continued based on a request by defense 
counsel that the State produce Ross Argyle, the state's informant, as a witness. The State 
agreed to attempt to locate Mr. Argyle and bring him to testify. The Court then continued 
the entrapment hearing until March 8, 1993. The trial was set for March 9, 1993. The 
Court took the other motions under advisement. 
On March 8, 1993, further proceedings were held regarding the entrapment defense. 
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The State was not able to produce Mr. Argyle. (See infra p. 14). The State presented 
additional evidence and rested. The defendant did not put on any witnesses and the 
defendant did not testify. The Court took the entrapment motion under advisement and 
struck the March 9, 1993 trial date. 
IL 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
The defendant has raised four issues in his Motion to Dismiss. Additionally, in his 
supplemental memorandum, defendant argues that his due process rights have been violated. 
This Court will treat each issue separately. 
A. Double Jeopardy. 
Defendant argues that the state prosecution violates his right not be twice placed in 
jeopardy. This constitutional guarantee is found in the fifth amendment to the United States 
constitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. Defendant argues that he was first 
placed in jeopardy in the federal prosecution. "Jeopardy attaches when an accused in put on 
trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid indictment (or information), and a jury 
has been sworn and impaneled." State v.Pearson. 818 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1991); Crist v. 
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978). As the State points out in its opposition memorandum, the 
defendant was not placed in jeopardy during his federal prosecution because the case was 
dismissed prior to trial. The dismissal in the federal court "with prejudice" is not 
synonymous with the attachment of double jeopardy. Accordingly, the Court denies 
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defendant's claim of a violation of his double jeopardy right. 
R, Section 76-1-403 and Single Criminal Episode. 
Defendant argues that the present prosecution is barred by the Utah Single Criminal 
Episode statute. U.C.A. §76-1-403 states in pertinent part: 
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense for the same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal 
episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should 
have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402 (2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution; 
(iv) was terminated by final order or judgment for the 
defendant that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and 
that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact 
that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent 
prosecution. 
Section 76-1-402 (2) provides: 
Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall 
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single trial court: and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(emphasis added). 
The defendant presupposes that a federal prosecution for offenses arising out of the 
same criminal episode will trigger the protection of the above sections. But as the State has 
noted, the above quoted statute requires that the prior and subsequent prosecution be within 
the jurisdiction of a single trial court. The Court adopts the reasoning of the State's 
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memorandum and accordingly denies defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on section 76-1-
403. 
C. Prosecution in a Concurrent Jurisdiction. 
Defendant argues that the present prosecution is barred by Utah Code Ann. section 
76-1-404, which states: 
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses 
within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction, 
federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a 
subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an 
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined 
in Section 76-1-403 and (2) the subsequent prosecution is for the same offense 
or offenses 
Defendant argues that the federal dismissal "with prejudice" meets one of the four 
requirements as stated in section 76-1-403 (acquittal, conviction, improperly terminated, or 
terminated by a final order that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact 
that must be proved in a subsequent prosecution). None of these requirements applies to the 
current case. This Court denies defendant's motion based on U.C.A. section 76-1-404. 
P. Due Process and the Right to a Speedy Trial. 
The defendant alleges a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Related to that 
argument, he further alleges a violation of federal due process. This argument appears to be 
a variation of defendant's double jeopardy argument. Defendant relies on State v. Shabata, 
678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984) and United States v. Belcher. 762 F.Supp. 666 (W.D. Va. 1991). 
In Shatbata, state prosecutors were charged with the knowledge of investigators based on the 
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rationale that prosecutors and law enforcement officers make up the prosecutorial team. In 
Belcher, the former prosecution was brought in state court and subsequently in federal court 
by a single prosecutor who had authority to prosecute in both jurisdictions. 
The defendant reasons that since federal and state officers were involved in the 
underlying investigation which was common to both the federal and state prosecutions, that 
the subsequent state prosecution should therefore be bound by result in the federal 
prosecution. At very least, defendant urges that the time he spent should be considered for 
purposes of speedy trial purposes. 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of subsequent prosecution by 
different jurisdictions. State v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987). In Franklin, the state 
prosecution took place after the federal prosecution had concluded. In discussing the 
rationale for allowing subsequent state prosecution the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
We do not agree with the above-described approach because it relinquishes 
unnecessarily the power of the state to try and punish those who break its 
laws. Under the rule urged by defendant, the State of Utah would be 
foreclosed from legitimate prosecutions by the errors, omissions, or 
inadequacies of federal prosecutions and would be unable to try even a 
defendant who had received a federal pardon or whose conviction was reversed 
by a federal appellate court because of an error in the federal trial. See, e.g., 
State v. LeCoure. 158 Mont. 340, 491 P.2d 1228 (1971) (defendant acquitted 
of federal charges based on assault of F.B.I, agent because federal prosecutor 
did not prove agent was acting within his official capacity at time of assault 
and double jeopardy barred state law assault charges). We note also that the 
approach urged by defendant, under which the federal prosecution would be 
treated as if it were a Utah proceeding, would allow the federal government to 
destroy Utah's right to try defendant merely by bringing defendant to trial for 
some minor lesser included offense. See Brown v. Ohio. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
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Defendant asks us to contrast the benefits to the state from the 
dual-sovereignty doctrine, which he deems slight, with the unfairness to the 
individual that may result from two trials. The protection against multiple 
trials perceived by defendant is largely illusory. Were we to hold that Utah 
could not try individuals because they had been previously tried in a federal 
court, we still could not prevent the federal government from trying 
individuals after they had been tried by Utah; we would thus be surrendering 
state sovereignty in exchange for a more theoretical than real gain in individual 
rights. 
Franklin, at 38. Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has also held that the time a 
defendant spends in federal custody cannot be counted against the state for speedy trial 
purposes. State v. Trafnv. 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990). 
Accordingly, this Court rejects defendants reasoning and determines that defendant's 
due process rights are not violated by the subsequent state prosecution. Specifically, this 
Court will not hold the state prosecution responsible for procedural errors in federal court. 
The Court also finds that defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. Defendant 
waived his right to a speedy trial at the December 10, 1992 hearing. The delays prior to the 
December 10, 1992 trial date occurred as a result of defendants pro se motions and defense 
counsel's motions discussed above. The state has been ready to proceed at every stage of 
this case and has not caused the delays. This Court denies defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
based on an alleged violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial. 
II. 
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 
Defendant also argues that the charges should be dismissed due to entrapment by the 
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law enforcement officers. Defendant alleges in his Memorandum in Support that Ross 
Argyle, acting as a government agent, improperly enticed defendant while both were 
incarcerated in Oregon. (See Defendant's Memorandum in Support re: Entrapment, p.2) 
Section 76-2-303 states the standard governing entrapment determinations. 
76-2-303. Entrapment. 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or 
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in 
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods 
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an 
opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
Once an entrapment defense has been asserted, it is the burden of the prosecution to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not entrapped. State v. Wilson, 565 
P.2d 66 (Utah 1977). The entrapment defense can be seen as an attack on the state's burden 
to prove that defendant acted voluntarily. State v. Curtis. 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975). 
The statute cited above incorporates an objective standard. "[T]he focus is not on the 
propensities and predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the police conduct 
revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for 
the proper use of government power; the subjective test is specifically rejected." State v. 
Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979). The standard for finding that entrapment has occurred is 
a factual finding that the conduct of the law enforcement officers or their undercover partners 
create^ a substantial risk that the offense could be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
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commit it. The statute prohibits active inducement, luring an average person into the 
commission of an offense. 
Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals discussed a trial court's denial of an entrapment 
motion. State v. Gallegos. 207 Utah Adv. 53 (Utah App. 1993). In Galleeos, the police 
employed a convicted felon as a confidential informant. In upholding the trial court's 
decision the court of appeals stated: "At no time in any of the transactions did Bennett 
employ inducements that would have been, as a matter of law, sufficient to induce an 
ordinary person to commit the crimes for which defendant was convicted." Id. at 55. 
Therefore, agents of law enforcement officers are treated under the objective standard as 
well. 
The Court has reviewed the transcripts of telephone calls placed to the defendant 
between the dates of August 2, and August 7, 1991. Both parties have stipulated as to the 
accuracy of the transcript and the Court admitted the transcript. Additionally, the Court 
heard testimony from many of the officers involved in the investigation. After carefully 
reviewing all the evidence presented, this Court determines that the State has proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the law enforcement conduct did not create a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Also, in the present 
case there is nothing in the recorded transcripts on conversations between the defendant and 
Argyle that demonstrates an "inducement" offered by Argyle to defendant. 
The facts supporting this determination are numerous. The transcript of the telephone 
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conversations between August 2, and August 7 are replete with statements by defendant 
demonstrating his willingness and eagerness to set up a methamphetamine lab. For example, 
conversation between the defendant and Ross Argyle made on August 2, 1991 at 10:20 a.m. 
demonstrate this point. The defendant also fully understood the risk he was taking.1 Rather 
1
 On August 3, 1991, telephone call beginning at 8:55 p.m., page four, the defendant 
and Charles Illsley had the following conversation: 
Jim: Yeah right. It, we, we, we can, we can make ten million dollars, you 
know, a million, ten million. We can make fifty million, if everybody 
has the balls to do it, but the 
Charles: If I didn't have, if I didn't have the balls, I wouldn't have been running 
around. 
Jim: The larger you do it though, the more chance you take, you see what 
I'm saying? 
Charles: Yeah. 
Jim: I'm only talking about a one shot deal and then laying low. 
Later in the same conversation, page 6, the defendant demonstrates the risks to himself if 
arrested: 
Jim: I'm not trying to come off as a hard guy. 
Charles: I mean, no, I hear you, you got to be careful. 
Jim: I'm just trying to tell you what we can do and what we can't do. 
Charles: You know, if you're not careful, you end up doing time, and I ain't 
doing time. 
Jim: Yeah, that's the whole thing. 
Charles: Behind this. 
Jim: Yeah, and ain't none of us going to do time because I'm, I'm, I'll go 
down the hard way, you know, this time cause 
Charles: Yeah. 
Jim: You know, you know what, this time, this is my third time, I'll, I'll do 
to much time, you know, a lot of time. 
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than arm twist the defendant into coming to Utah, the officers involved merely provided the 
defendant with an opportunity to set up the lab. The statements in the transcript and the 
testimony of the officers are consistent. The defendant planned on coming to Utah, setting 
up a Meth lab, selling the product, and dividing the proceeds between himself, Ross Argyle, 
and an undercover DEA agent, Charles Illsley. The defendant specifically requested money 
from agent Illsley and the Court specifically finds that the defendant's request for "tuition" 
did not induce defendant to come to Utah and set up the lab. The ten thousand dollars was 
the amount agent Illsley agreed to pay defendant for learning how to produce 
methamphetamine. 
The Court therefore determines that the State has met its burden of proving voluntary 




Defendant made an oral motion at the March 8, 1993 hearing that defendant has been 
denied due process because of the failure of the State to produce an essential witness. The 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, and the sixth amendment of the United States 
Constitution provide, among the rights afforded an accused, the right to compulsory process 
for defense witnesses. The issue before this Court is, whether the unavailability of a 
proposed defense witness violates due process of law. 
12 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: "The purpose of due process is to prevent 
fundamental unfairness, and one of its essential elements is the opportunity to defend." State 
v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1991). Although this Court has been unable to locate any 
authority directly addressing the occasion where a proposed witness is unavailable, this Court 
believes that cases interpreting U.C.A. Section 77-21-3 are analogous. Section 77-21-3 
provides for issuance of a certificate of attendance in criminal cases for material witnesses. 
In State v. Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the defendant challenged the trial court's 
denial of issuing a certificate for attendance of a witness. The supreme court held that 
H[f]ailure to demonstrate materiality as required by statute is a basis for affirming the trial 
court's ruling." The supreme court went on to state: 
The sixth amendment to the federal constitution guarantees that '[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor....' In Washington v. Texas. 388 
U.S. 14 (1967), the United States Supreme Court found a violation of this 
guarantee where the defendant had been arbitrarily deprived of 'testimony 
[that] would have been relevant and material, and... vital to the defense.' Id. 
at 16 (emphasis added). In United States v. Valenzuela-BernaL 458 U.S. 858 
(1982), the Supreme Court reasoned that the language of the sixth amendment 
and of Washington suggested that a criminal defendant, in order to establish a 
violation of his constitutional right to compulsory process, must make some 
plausible showing that the testimony of the absent witness 'would have been 
both material and favorable to his defense.' Id. at 873 (footnote omitted). 
Testimony is material, and its exclusion is therefore prejudicial, if there is a 
reasonable probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the trial. 
'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 
2068 (1984). 
'The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern 
with the justice of the finding of guilt.... This means that the omission must be 
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evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt 
about guilt whether or not the evidence is considered, there is no justification 
for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable 
validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient 
to create a reasonable doubt.' 
Id. This Court will apply the above principles to the present case. 
There is no dispute as to the State's willingness to produce Mr. Argyle. The 
defendant requested that the State produce Argyle as a witness at the hearing and trial. The 
State was not able to locate Argyle and Mr. Taylor proffered that the State had attempted to 
locate Argyle at the address provided by defense counsel, attempted to locate him in Utah 
and in Oregon, and that the State had placed an investigator on the problem without avail. 
The Court determines that based on the above, Argyle is not an material witness and 
therefore not essential in order to provide the defendant with due process of law. In support 
of this determination the Court finds the following facts based on testimony presented at the 
hearing: (1) Ross Argyle acted as a confidential informant during the investigation; (2) that 
Argyle became an informant after his extradition to Utah on probation violation charges; (3) 
that Argyle was provided renumeration for information; (4) all conversations between Argyle 
and defendant made while Argyle was in Provo were tape recorded. There was no evidence 
presented to the Court that Argyle was an agent for the DEA or other law enforcement 
agency prior to his extradition to Utah. Only by making some kind of showing that Argyle 
was an agent while incarcerated with the defendant could the defendant raise the materiality 
of Argyle's actions during that period. 
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The Court hereby denies defendant's motion for dismissal based on violation of due 
process of law. 
Dated t h i s / i f day of March, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 




MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
P.O. Box "L" 
43 East 200 North 
Provof Utah 84603 
Telephone: 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : MOTION TO SECURE ATTENDANCE OF 
OUT OF STATE WITNESS 
VS. : 
Case No. 921400455 FS 
JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS3 : (JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS) 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the defendant, by and through his attorney of 
record, Michael D. Esplin, and hereby moves this Court for 
certificate pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 77-21-3 to 
assure the presence of Ross Argyle, a resident of the State of 
Oregon, at the hearing on defendant's Motion for Entrapment and at 
the trial of this matter. Defendant's request is made upon the 
following grounds: 
1. The offense with which the defendant is charged is a 
result of a law enforcement operation in which the defendant was 
induced to come to the State of Utah by law enforcement officers or 
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persons acting as their agents. 
2. Defendant has filed a Motion for Determination of 
Entrapment Defense in this matter. 
3. The person who initiated contact with the defendant and 
made representations to defendant which defendant alleges to 
constitute entrapment was Ross Argyle, the out of state witness 
defendant seeks to have appear. 
4. Defendant has reason to-believe that Argyle was acting 
with and on behalf of the law enforcement agencies which ultimately 
charged defendant with the offenses presently before this court. 
5. Defendant's position is that Argyle improperly induced 
defendant to engage in the conduct resulting in the present charges 
upon which defendant is being prosecuted. 
6. Further, defendant believes that Argyle was promised 
substantial consideration for inducing the defendant into illegal 
conduct and that the reception of said consideration was dependant 
upon the success of his efforts to induce defendant into 
participation in illegal activities. This conduct resulted in 
procedures on the part of the law enforcement agencies which are 
contrary to public policy and which resulted in improper inducement 
by Argyle of defendant. 
7. Without the witness Argyle, the defendant cannot fully 
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present his defense of entrapment in this matter• 
WHEREFORE, defendant requests this court issue the appropriate 
certificate to assure the witness's attendance at the hearing on 
defendant's entrapment defense and at the trial of this matter. 
DATED this / day of December, 1992. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
MICHAEL D. EBPLIN-
Attorney for Defendant 
3 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the 
foregoing instrument to Kay Bryson, Utah County Attorney, at 100 
East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606 this 1st day of December, 
1992. 
EXHIBIT "E» 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
Telephone: 37 3-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS, JR., 
Defendant. 
ORDER TO PRODUCE WITNESS 
Case No. 921400455 
(Judge Lynn W. Davis) 
This matter came on for hearing before the above-entitled 
Court on the 10th day of December, 1992, the Honorable Lynn W. 
Davis, District Court Judge, presiding- The Plaintiff, STATE OF 
UTAH, was represented by James Taylor, Deputy Utah County Attorney. 
The Defendant was present in person and was represented by Michael 
D. Esplin. The Court and counsel discussed the matter of the 
Defendant's motions concerning the witness, Ross Argyle. Based 
upon the Stipulation of the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
STATE OF UTAH produce Ross Argyle as a witness for the STATE and 
that Mr. Argyle be present at the continuation of this matter on 
March/ 8, 1993. Defendant is to cooperate in supplying any 
information to the STATE which would be helpful in ascertaining the 
whereabouts of Mr. Argyle. 
DATED this day of January, 1993-
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
LYNN W. DAVIS 
District Court Judge 
JAMES TAYLOR 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
